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don’t directly let attackers eaves-
drop on voice conversations.
Figure 1b shows these vulner-
abilities’ sources. Given CVE’s 
nature, it isn’t very surprising that 
most of the problems stem from 
implementation issues. However, a 
sizable and arguably undercounted 
source of problems is misconfigu-
rations; these include default ad-
ministrator credentials, insecure 
and undocumented services run-
ning on the device (such as remote-
ly accessible debuggers running on 
VoIP handsets, with no authentica-
tion!), and access to otherwise re-
stricted services through alternative 
interfaces (for example, a Web front 
end). Finally, a very few protocol 
vulnerabilities allow DoS attacks4 
or toll fraud.5 These problems were 
discovered (or, at least, reported) 
only recently, which is surprising 
given how long the standards doc-
uments have been published.
Research into  
VoIP Security
Considering VoIP’s importance, 
the scope of such systems (which 
include and depend on whole 
families of protocols, including 
the Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol, Domain Name System, 
and Web services) and the breadth 
of vulnerabilities, considerable re-
search exists in this space. In con-
junction with my vulnerability 
analysis, I surveyed all research 
papers I could find on VoIP secu-
rity.6 I started with papers I was 
personally familiar with, then 
those published in the proceed-
ings of top security conferences, 
workshops, and journals from the 
past five years, and the results from 
equipment consolidation and, for 
the consumer market, new busi-
ness models. However, VoIP 
systems also represent high com-
plexity in terms of architecture, 
protocols, and implementation, 
with a corresponding increase in 
the potential for misuse.
VoIP Vulnerabilities
As part of the Vampire proj-
ect (http://vampire.gforge.inria.
fr/)—funded by the French Na-
tional Research Agency (ANR) 
and tasked to better under-
stand the VoIP security problem 
space—I conducted a survey of 
all published vulnerabilities in 
the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) database and in 
two IETF RFC Internet drafts. In 
total, these included 221 problems 
disclosed from 1999 through No-
vember 2009. These issues ranged 
from relatively straightforward 
problems that can lead to server or 
equipment crashes (denial of ser-
vice [DoS]) to more serious prob-
lems that let adversaries eavesdrop 
on communications, remotely 
take over servers or handsets, im-
personate users, avoid billing or 
charge another user (toll fraud), 
and so on.
Figure 1a breaks down the 
vulnerabilities by type, using the 
VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) 
taxonomy.1 Most problems lead to 
DoS attacks, typically via server 
or equipment crashes, although 
less obvious DoS attacks that users 
or administrators wouldn’t notice 
immediately have also been re-
ported. Note that our classification 
likely underestimates the number 
of more serious, remote-takeover 
vulnerabilities: many CVE entries 
report a DoS vulnerability, in-
dicating that attackers could also 
conduct a buffer overflow attack, 
but don’t follow up with a thor-
ough analysis.
What the graph doesn’t show is 
that VoIP servers and clients (end 
devices) each account for roughly 
half the DoS vulnerabilities. Al-
though we theoretically know how 
to conduct fault tolerance for server 
applications, it’s less clear how we 
can protect end devices; worse, up-
dating VoIP equipment’s firmware 
occurs rather infrequently outside 
enterprise environments.
Another interesting lesson from 
this graph and the supporting 
analysis2,3 is that traffic eavesdrop-
ping and hijacking constitutes 
roughly one-fifth of these vulner-
abilities; digging a little deeper, 
most of these problems enable 
traffic analysis via access to a user 
device or server’s call logs but 
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onsumers and enterprises alike are rapidly 
adopting voice-over-IP (VoIP) technolo-
gies, which offer higher flexibility and more 
features than traditional telephony infra-









searching CiteSeer, IEEE Xplore, 
Google Scholar, and the ACM 
Digital Library. I used obvious 
keywords such as “VoIP security” 
and “SIP security” and recursively 
followed relevant cited papers. 
I omitted some that were only 
peripherally relevant to VoIP or 
VoIP security. In the end, I looked 
at 200 papers, which I classified 
using an augmented VoIPSA tax-
onomy, given that more than half 
didn’t naturally fit in the VoIPSA 
scheme.
Figure 2a shows how I classified 
these papers using the  VoIPSA tax-
onomy. What we see is a breadth 
of research but also a lack of atten-
tion to some problem areas that ap-
pear to dominate the set of known 
vulnerabilities. Specifically, only 
21 percent of the papers focused 
on the DoS problem, which cor-
responds to 58 percent of disclosed 
vulnerabilities. Conversely, a large 
focus (50 percent) is on VoIP spam, 
also known as spam over Inter-
net telephony (SPIT); although 18 
percent of vulnerabilities fit in the 
same category (social threats), few 
were actually related to SPIT.
Figure 2b shows the break-
down of the remaining papers. 
Approximately 40 percent are sur-
veys and overviews of VoIP prob-
lems and security mechanisms. 
Some could in fact help against 
specific problems (such as DoS), 
although much of the effort in 
both intrusion detection and ar-
chitectures is focused on SPIT de-
tection and prevention.
T he lesson to draw from the juxtaposition of these two 
surveys is that further research is 
needed into DoS attacks against 
VoIP systems. Furthermore, the 
research community and security 
professionals should better address 
configuration problems and emer-
gent properties, especially those 
arising from unexpected interac-
tions among different services, 
such as cross-site scripting attacks 
on Web management interfaces 
implemented by injecting code 
through the SIP Caller field.
One limitation of my work 
to date is that it represents a view 
that’s potentially detached from 
what’s actually happening on the 
Internet with respect to mali-
cious activity and VoIP devices. 
Thus, some of the next steps in the 
Vampire project include design-
ing, implementing, and deploying 
a distributed VoIP honeynet that 
will give us some insight as to the 
operational significance of differ-
ent vulnerability types and the po-
tential impact of various research 
thrusts. In the meantime, VoIP 
users and operators must remain 
vigilant and follow best practices, 
including the timely application of 
firmware and patch updates, the 
use of VoIP-aware firewalls and 
intrusion-detection systems, and 
the overall hardening of the criti-
cal services on which their VoIP 
infrastructures depend. 
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Figure 1. Vulnerabilities in voice over IP (VoIP). We can see (a) the vulnerability 
classification using the VoIP Security Alliance taxonomy and (b) the 

























Figure 2. Voice-over-IP (VoIP) security papers. I classified (a) 43% of the 200 
papers I surveyed using the VoIP Security Alliance taxonomy. I conducted an 
informal classification on (b) the remaining 57 percent of the papers (bars 
indicate the number of papers).
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